Hrant Dink
The 5th anniversary of Hrant Dink’s martyrdom was marked in London with a meeting in the House of Lords on the 18th January and a silent Vigil outside the Turkish Embassy the following day. The meeting was sponsored by Baroness Randerson. His Grace Bishop Vahan of the Armenian Church said a prayer to start the meeting and Desmond Fernandes delivered a speech on the current persecution in Turkey. A speech by Dr Suran Cam on the crypto-Armenians in Turkey was read. Hyrbair Mari spoke on the persecution of Baluchis in Occuppied Baluchistan and Wilson Choudry spoke on the abuses of Christians in Pakistan.
Eilian Williams quoted from Rakel Dink to show the experience of those Armenians who reside in the Turkish interior:”All the time up to today, we Armenians were humiliated, insulted for being Armenians;we heard people use the term Armenian as a curse. We heard it and we still keep hearing it as such in the newspapers, TV,birth registration offices.;we hear it from public servants all the way to the highest authorities. ”
He pointed out that Rakel did not find Justice in the conclusion of the trial this week, with those of the deep state who were implicated in the terrble crime against Hrant’s life protected.
Crypto Armenians in Turkey by Dr Surhan Cam
In 1974, Hrant Dink ‘discovered’ a lost tribe of Armenians in Varto, Kurdistan. The tribe members did not know that they were Armenian. Nor did anyone else know it. They were mostly Alevi Muslims and spoke only Kurdish. Hrant taught Armenian to some of them and married to one of them. This was the first of such discoveries. But it was also the last one.
Currently, we know very little about crypto Armenians. There is no reliable figure about the size of their population. Estimated numbers vary wildly, from few hundred thousand to millions. Not least for this reason, it is a politically challenging task to talk about crypto Armenians. The issue is perceived as ‘Pandora’s box’ by various commentators both in Armenian and Turkey.
It is argued that crypto Armenians can be used by the Turkish government to undermine the credibility of, what the Turkish officials derogatively call, ‘genocide merchants’. It is feared that if a high number of crypto Armenians is reliably established, then the Turkish government would purport that ‘we did not exterminate them. They are living among us’. Arguably, these sorts of ploys would do no good for the Turkish government rather than undermining its own credibility further. However, the potential implications of such a debate for crypto Armenians are worth a careful examination.
Some discussants expressed concerns over the possibility of a danger that this issue can be exaggerated by ‘fascistic forces’ in Turkey to use crypto Armenians as a scapegoat for the troubles of Turkey in political (and economic) terms. It would be unwise to underestimate such worries, provided that even some heavy-weight intellectuals within Turkey’s left-wing circles proactively take part in never-ending campaigns against ethnic and religious minorities such as Jewish, Kurdish, Alevi and Assyrian, as well as Armenian, communities. They propagate, for example, that such minority groups secretly retain the command of economic and political powers/affairs in Turkey, pretending to be Turks.
Recently, there has also been an upward trend in nationalistic tides. Among others, especially three international events have much contributed to this. One is the recent outlawing of genocide denials in France. Turkish reaction went as far as freezing diplomatic ties with Paris in addition to discouraging domestic consumers from using French goods. Also, the departure of US troops from Iraq and the rise of tensions in Washington-Tehran relations over the Hormuz strait have reputedly boosted the geopolitical importance of Turkey’s cooperation with the West. These incidents are considered by hawkish intelligence and military personnel to be ‘an opportunity for freehand to vanquish rogue Kurds’: On new year’s eve, more than thirty Kurdish smugglers crossing Turkey-Iraq border were opened fire at and killed by the Turkish security forces with no warning or call for surrender. In doing so, the critics say, the Turkish state terrorised civilians in an attempt to deter Kurdish independence movements. No one has been held responsible for the ‘accident’ so far. In the light of these developments, some columnists postulated that the ruling AK Party is moving away from (mildly) Islamist tendencies to nationalism. However, such a conclusion reflects only one side of the coin.
Paradoxically, there is also a widening understanding in Turkey that appreciates the importance of democracy and respect for human rights. When Abdullah Gul, the president of Turkey paid a first-ever visit to Armenia for a friendly football match between both countries in 2008, many commentators interpreted this as a manoeuvre to avert the recognition of genocide by the US Congress. Probably such scepticism was understandable to certain degree. However, there was also a deep-down wave sweeping across the country. This wave surfaced up during a historic demonstration in 2007 when hundreds of thousands of Turks took the streets in order to protest the killing of Hrant Dink. They chanted that ‘all we are Armenian, all we are Hrants’. Likewise, in a different setting, Tayip Erdogan, the Turkish Prime Minister denounced the long history of assimilation policies in Turkey. And no less significantly, he had done this as part of the last election campaign with an accurate anticipation that such a strategy would increase his popularity among the electorate. After a landslide victory, he also apologised for the Dersim massacre that claimed the lives of thousands of Zazas in 1937/8.
The Turkish premier makes no word of apology to Armenians. And chattering classes are not holding their breath for such a gesture given that the word ‘genocide’ is still a taboo in Turkey. However, a closer scrutiny of political events would further reveal the deep-down tide. There is a rise in what one might call ‘non-Turkist nationalisms’. As opposed to conventional nationalism, non-Turkist nationalists claim that there is a tension between Turkism and national interests. Intellectuals in this vein, for example, are of the view that it would be in Turkey’s best interest to face its history with downsides as well as upsides, like that of many other countries. Such interlockers argue that ‘we should start to talk about apologising to Armenians’. A leading columnist on this front recently contended that ‘regardless of what or how happened, millions of Armenians disappeared, and this disappearance per se amounts to genocide’. To the surprise of many observers, he was not arrested for his remark. Such commentators have also begun to criticise the official sentiment that accepting the genocide would trigger property/land claims by Armenians. They pragmatically underline potential opportunities for new investments by the Armenian Diaspora, especially in the economically deprived provinces of Eastern Anatolia.
History is a burden on Turkey’s politics but the social realities of present times also add further layers. The issue of crypto Armenians raises questions about the fabric of ‘Turkish’ society. Kemalism takes pride in the inclusiveness of its mantra that ‘What happiness to the one who can say I am Turk’. The pride, however, has begun to give way to fear for not knowing who would or would not wish to disclaim Turkishness, once people are given the chance to opt out. It is virtually impossible to know even whether or not the Turks themselves would become a new minority group among the populaces. Most of the policy makers, however, appear to have made their mind that ‘genuinely Turkish people would become marginalised’. They also whisper about ‘the reversal of ethnic cleansing’ in the shape of the return of expats. Indeed, several thousand Assyrians, for example, have already returned in recent years. One of these returnees was quoted with large fonts in the headlines: ‘I am home!’
There is a need to promote an understanding that human rights and democracy are not just for the majority but for the minorities as well. This, inter alia, requires the scarping of Article 301 which arbitrarily criminalise intellectuals and journalist through a mischievous excuse of ‘insulting Turkishness’. The code essentially serves for muzzling up multi-culturalist voices. Other sorts of limitations on freedom of thought should also be abolished by the new constitution which is expected to replace the present one in 2012. Above all, the rights of minorities to exist without having to deny their identity can no longer be disputed. For this reason, it is essential that the Turkish government ensure ethnic and religious minorities that they would be secure when they live up to their own culture, language, religion or sects.
Nevertheless, no one would remain grateful forever for not being killed for who they are. The Turkish state needs to fulfil its cultural responsibilities. To start with, the government officials should share ancestral information with the members of public other than keeping it behind closed doors. They ought to be transparent to people in terms of what they know about the ethnic backgrounds of local communities. Individuals should also be assisted to find out such information when it is not readily available. Moreover, populations need to be provided with financial and institutional support to practice their cultures. The government still fails, for example, to supply urban spaces to Alevi populations for their cemevi (worship houses). Christian communities feel lucky when they are simply allowed to use their own churches, let alone getting financial support for renovations or building new ones.
As the centenary of 1915 tragedy draws closer, it is possible to work toward the beginning of a forward-looking era marked by trust-building initiatives and debunking of prejudices between Armenian and Turkish people. For example, Hrant Dink case which is one of the high profile lawsuits in Turkey can be used to foster the trust of public in judiciary system among both Armenians and Turks. The trial is now interwoven with an on-going war within the Turkish state through a series of court cases against some military coup plotters, far-right gangs and Mafia. The reason for this is because the murderer is believed to be part of nationalistic paramilitaries. All these legal investigations should immediately be finalised for justice.
In addition, restrictions on Ottoman archives should be lifted for national and international researchers. In particular, Armenian government should capitalise on a recent call by the Turkish government to do this mutually as well as trying to convince third-part countries.
Finally, special funds should be allocated, especially by the European Commission, to explore crypto Armenians for the restoration and revival of their cultures which are under the threat of extinction.
